Hwasong-17
The Hwasong-17 is a North Korean two-stage, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile. First unveiled on 10 October 2020 at a military parade, the Japanese Ministry of Defence estimates its operational range at or more. Unlike its predecessors, the Hwasong-17 may be capable of carrying multiple warheads.
Hwasong-17
- Name
- Hwasong-17
- Field
- intercontinental ballistic missile
- Region
- North Korea
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The Hwasong-17 is a North Korean two-stage, liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile. First unveiled on 10 October 2020 at a military parade, the Japanese Ministry of Defence estimates its operational range at or more. Unlike its predecessors, the Hwasong-17 may be capable of carrying multiple warheads.
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wikidata · Q100701328 · wikipedia · Hwasong-17
In this article
Overview
Overview
North Korea claimed the Hwasong-17's first successful launch occurred on 24 March 2022. Some Western analysts instead believe the 24 March launch was an earlier missile design, and a later test that took place on 18 November 2022 was the first successful test launch.
Key facts
Key facts
• Name — Hwasong-17 • Engine — First stage: two RD-250-type rocket engines • Filling Weight — About • Filling — nuclear weapon, possibly MRV • Launch Platform — 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) • Weight — About 80000-150000 kg • Production Date — 2020–present • Manufacturer — North Korea • Propellant — liquid propellant • Used By — Korean People's Army Strategic Force • Origin — North Korea • Is Missile — yes • Diameter — 2.4-2.9 m • Service — 2020–present • Type — Intercontinental ballistic missile
Satellite launch vehicle derivative
Satellite launch vehicle derivative
The Hwasong-17 may also contribute to ICBM testing by acting as a satellite launch vehicle (SLV), as the missile serves as the first stage of the Chollima-1 SLV, which unsuccessfully tried to launch a satellite on 31 May 2023 when the second stage booster failed to ignite and had a successful flight on 21 November 2023. North Korea has only fired long-range ballistic missiles on lofted trajectories, in part because tracking can only be done from land-based sensors. The ability to receive data signals is lost at a certain distance and altitude due to the Earth's curvature, and they lack ships or planes to continue monitoring an RV beyond those distances. The Hwasong-17 has more capable rocket motors and more energetic liquid propellants than North Korea's previous Taepodong-2/Unha-3 booster, making it able to launch a satellite twice as heavy as was previously possible into low Earth orbit. While the ICBM configuration of Hwasong-17 can deliver a payload to a Low Earth orbit, the payload capacity can be increased if North Korea configures it to be an SLV, making it a medium-lift launch vehicle. The missile's first launches were claimed to be related to testing elements for a reconnaissance satellite. As an SLV, Hwasong-17 could launch a satellite that would be in a position to monitor future ICBM flights and payload reentry from space, enabling more realistic testing by firing them on normal trajectories out to further distances.
History
History
Hwasong-17 made its public debut in a military parade on 10 October 2020. It was mounted on 11-axle launchers and appeared at the parade's end. North Korea called Hwasong-17 as "new strategic weapon" without mentioning official designation, and the missile was tentatively named Hwasong-16. At the Self-Defence-2021 exhibition, North Korea revealed the official name of the missile as Hwasong-17. Test launches of the Hwasong-17 were allegedly carried out first on 27 February 2022, and again on 5 March. North Korea did not publicize news of the launches, with INDOPACOM revealing them later. The United States believed the tests were not intended to demonstrate the ICBM's range but conduct early evaluations of its capabilities. North Korea publicly claimed the launches were intended to test components of a reconnaissance satellite at operational altitudes without disclosing they had been lofted by the new ICBM. It is possible the launches were done to test both satellite components and the ICBM, but only the former was admitted to limit potential international criticism. Missile expert Jeffrey Lewis also raised the possibility that these were launches of the post-boost vehicle for the second stage of the Hwasong-17. A missile launch was attempted on 16 March 2022, but it was a failure. It is possible that it was a Hwasong-17 test, but was not acknowledged by North Korea due to the unsuccessful launch. A test launch of a disputed missile type was carried out by North Korea on 24 March 2022. The launch was a technical success that broke many records for North Korea, for example regarding height and flight time. The footage of the launch may have been doctored, with missile analysts being unable to confirm that the missile that was launched on 24 March was a Hwasong-17, due to inconsistencies with objects in the background of the launch, which matched to satellite imagery on an earlier date than 24 March. Two shots of the observation bus that Kim Jong Un was in appeared to be taken in different locations and grass that was burnt in a controlled burn appeared to be unburnt on Korean Central Television footage. South Korean intelligence alleges that the missile launched on 24 March was likely an improved and modified Hwasong-15, though according to NK News, there may be other reasons for using old footage, such as a camera failure. After the test, Hwasong-17 appreared at the 25 April 2022 military parade. A further test took place on 18 November 2022. At a parade on 8 February 2023 marking the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, twelve Hwasong-17s on mobile launchers were displayed. Depending on the exact number of missiles and potential multiple reentry vehicles, North Korea could technically have reached the point where they have enough ICBMs carrying enough warheads to overwhelm the existing amount of GMD interceptors, although no multiple warhead tests had yet been conducted. A third test flight occurred on 16 March 2023.
List of tests
List of tests
• Illustration — Lofted trajectories of Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17
Announced tests
Announced tests
• Attempt — Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) — Location — Pre-launch announcement — Outcome — Additional notes — References • 1 — 24 March 2022, 2:34 p.m. — Sil-li missile facility, near Pyongyang International Airport — Signs of an ICBM or satellite launch were allegedly detected by the United States. — First announced test of the Hwasong-17, with an apogee of and a horizontal displacement of, with a total flight time of 4,052 seconds. Kim Jong Un, who issued the launch order a day before the test flight, supervised the launch, and celebrated with soldiers and researchers from the Academy of National Defense Science. United States condemned the launch. The launch could have instead been an extended range Hwasong-15, with video footage of the launch being inconsistent with the conditions on 24 March. • 2 — 18 November 2022, 10:14 a.m. — Pyongyang International Airport — None — Second test firing of Hwasong-17 that has been publicly acknowledged by North Korean state media. Kim Jong Un supervised the launch along with his wife and daughter. The missile flew on a lofted trajectory, reaching a maximum altitude of while flying with a maximum speed of Mach. The total flight time was 4,135 seconds. After the test, a transporter erector launcher (numbered 321), which was used for launching Hwasong-17 in this launch, was awarded three titles: Hero of the Republic, Order of the National Flag first class and Gold Star Medal. • 3 — 16 March 2023, 7:09 a.m. — None — Third test firing of Hwasong-17 that has been publicly acknowledged by North Korean state media. Kim Jong Un supervised the launch along with his wife and daughter. The missile flew on a lofted trajectory covering a distance of and reaching a maximum altitude of approximately. The total flight time was 4,151 seconds.
Alleged tests
Alleged tests
• Attempt — Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) — Location — Pre-launch announcement — Outcome — Additional notes — References • 1 — 27 February 2022 — Pyongyang International Airport — None — According to North Korea, the test was intended for testing reconnaissance satellite components. The missile was launched using lofted trajectory and achieved apogee, range. North Korea did not publish images of the launcher, instead, only images taken from launcher were published, and the launcher was later identified to be Hwasong-17. It is possible that the test was for verifying some functions before a maximum-range test-fire. • 2 — 5 March 2022 — None — North Korea also claimed the launch to test reconnaissance satellite components. The missile was launched using lofted trajectory and flew, achieved apogee. North Korea also did not publish images of the launcher, which was later identified to be Hwasong-17. It is possible that the test was for verifying some functions before a maximum-range test-fire. • 3 — 16 March 2022, 9:30 a.m. — None — The projectile exploded at an altitude below. Later, it was identified as Hwasong-17. Its erratic flight path and destruction of the missile could be witnessed from Pyongyang, and debris from the failed test fell near the city. It is possible that the footage of the claimed successful launch occurred eight days later is from this test. • 4 — 4 May 2022 — Around 30 April and 3 May, satellite captured some objects appear to be vehicles gathering at Pyongyang International Airport's northern runway. It is possible that these activities were for agriculture-related purposes. — It is possible that the missile was Hwasong-15. The missile flew, achieved apogee, with a maximum speed of Mach. North Korea did not release a press statement about the launch. • 5 — 25 May 2022 — 30 minutes before the test-fire, satellite imagery showed an object, appears to be the missile's TEL. — According to South Korean data, the missile flew with an apogee of. North Korea did not release a press statement about the launch. Over 30 minutes after the launch, North Korea test-fired two additional short-range ballistic missiles.
In popular culture
In popular culture
In February 2023, the Korea Stamp Corporation unveiled a series of stamps commemorating the November 2022 test-fire of Hwasong-17. Seven months later, the Hwasong-17, along with Hwasong-18 and Hwasal-2, was reported to be featured in patriotic desks for wearing. In November 2023, to celebrate the successful November 2022 test, North Korea created a new holiday on 18 November, called Missile Industry Day. Later, in May 2024, Hwasong-17-modeled toys and fireworks were also reported to be sold in North Korea. Hwasong-17 is also featured in North Korean propaganda posters.
Description
The Hwasong-17 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid-fueled road-mobile ICBM carried by a 22-wheeled transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle. The first stage uses two RD-250-based engines. Based on images released by North Korea, the missile's mass, length and diameter itself are judged to be about 80000-150000 kg, 24-26 m and 2.4-2.9 m respectively. The exact capabilities of the missile are as yet unconfirmed, though speculation by experts has fueled questions as to whether it could reach cities within the United States and potentially evade U.S. missile defenses too. It has a payload capacity of about and can have the capability of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) with three to four warheads and decoys as well, which would be a less expensive way to launch multiple warheads than deploying many ICBMs with single warhead payloads. The size and configuration of the 11-axle TEL indicates North Korea has developed a domestic capacity to manufacture such vehicles, a matter of concern to observers as attempting to block procurement of foreign-built TELs was one limitation on the nation's ICBM force. The country being able to produce their own launchers lifts that constraint and enables them to have the capacity to fire greater numbers of missiles. Information from Japan's defense minister Yasukazu Hamada and from the March 2022 test-fire suggests that the Hwasong-17's operational range of the Hwasong-17 is or more, if mounted with a sufficiently light warhead. Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace agreed that if the successful November missile test had been fired at the US instead of up into the air, it could easily reach anywhere in the continental United States. An alleged unsuccessful test-flight occurred on 2 November 2022 had suggested the Hwasong-17 might be unreliable. As of November 2022, it is unknown how much a large (for example, MRV) warhead would reduce Hwasong-17 range, and it is also unknown whether North Korean ICBM technology has the ability to deliver a warhead that survives re-entry into the atmosphere. Since the Hwasong-15 was already capable of striking most of the contiguous United States, the development of an even larger missile suggests North Korea is pursuing MRV, or even MIRV, payloads. As of 2020, the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system comprises 44 interceptors, requiring the launch of at least four to guarantee a hit, enabling it to protect against a maximum of 11 warheads. The Hwasong-17 may contain three or four warheads, or potentially a mix of decoys and real warheads, so the launch of just a few missiles would be enough to overwhelm U.S. defenses. Despite posing such a threat, the missile is greatly limited by its sheer size. The combined weight of the missile and its TEL restricts movement to North Korea's limited network of paved roads, as it would only be able to travel short distances on unpaved roads and only on sturdy ground. Unlike smaller liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, it is unlikely that it can be fueled at a secure location and then driven to and erected at a pre-surveyed site to cut down on launch preparation time, as vibrations during movement of such a large missile would risk causing damage and leaking volatile fuel. This restricts fueling to once it arrives at the launch site itself, a process requiring several hours to complete, leaving the missile exposed and vulnerable to pre-launch attack. The Hwasong-17's multiple warhead capability is also speculative, as it requires complex guidance and warhead release mechanisms needing significant flight testing to ensure reliability, and no test launches had been conducted by the time of its public unveiling. In August 2021, commander of United States Northern Command Glen D. VanHerck stated that the "KN-28 missile has a much larger capability, and the total number of missiles tends to increase." This suggests that the United States's designation of Hwasong-17 is KN-28, not the KN-27. With its alleged test flight in March 2022, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Jong Un stressed the development of the missile as a "a symbol of Juche power and fruition of self-reliance, [was] completed as a core strike means and a reliable nuclear war deterrence means of the DPRK strategic forces".
Literature
Scholarly footprint
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Notes from the source article
Cited by Wikipedia
Notes from the source article
These works are cited by the source article, in its own numbering. They are recorded as its citations, not as sources VALÉORINE has verified.
- 1.Demonstration of Toughest Response Posture of DPRK's Strategic Forces. Korean Central News Agency. 17 March 2023.
- 2.Elleman, Michael. Burying the Lead: North Korea Conceals That "Spy Satellite" Tests Are First Launches of New Large ICBM. 38 North. 16 March 2022.
- 3.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea's March 24 ICBM Launch: What if It Was the Hwasong-17. 38 North.
- 4.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea Unveils Two New Strategic Missiles in October 10 Parade. 38 North. 2020-10-10.
- 5.Elleman, Michael. Does Size Matter? North Korea's Newest ICBM. 38 North. 20 October 2020.
- 6.Kazianis, Harry. North Korea's Military Parade: Hwasong-16 Has Arrived?. 19FortyFive. 2020-10-10.
- 7.North Korea: What missiles does it have?. BBC News. 2022-10-06.
- 8.Smith, Josh. Factbox: North Korea's new Hwasong-17 'monster missile'. Reuters. 19 November 2022.
- 9.North Korea displays unseen ICBMs in military parade. Army Technology. 12 October 2020.
- 10.Davenport, Kelsey. North Korea Parades New Missile. Arms Control Association. 1 November 2020.
- 11.Varner, Joe. North Korea's Two New Strategic Missiles: What Do We Know and What Do They Mean for US Deterrence?. Modern War Institute. 15 October 2020.
- 12.Xu, Tianran. 24 March 2022 DPRK ICBM Test. Open Nuclear Network. 25 March 2022.
- 13.Kim, Hyung-Jin. North Korea test-fires ICBM with range to strike entire US. Associated Press. 18 November 2022.
- 14.Rahn, Wesley. What do we know about North Korea's 'monster missile'?. Deutsche Welle. 25 March 2022.
- 15.Tianran, Xu. Escalating Tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Open Nuclear Network. 11 November 2022.
- 16.S/2023/171. United Nations Security Council. 23, 185, 212. 7 March 2023.
- 17.Lee, Christy. Experts: North Korea Testing 'Monster' ICBM Designed to Attack US. Voice of America. 2022-11-09.
- 18.Mizokami, Kyle. North Korea Threw a Nuke Parade to Flaunt These Frightening New Weapons. Popular Mechanics. 12 October 2020.
- 19.Grady, John. Russia is Top Military Threat to U.S. Homeland, Air Force General Says. USNI News. 2021-08-18.
- 20.Striking Demonstration of Great Military Muscle of Juche Korea: Successful Test-Launch of New-Type ICBM. Korean Central News Agency. 2026-02-09.
- 21.Van Diepen, Vann H. Modest Beginnings: North Korea Launches Its First Reconnaissance Satellite. 38 North. 28 November 2023.
- 22.Wright, David. Reentry of North Korea's Hwasong-15 Missile. Union of Concerned Scientists. 7 December 2017.
- 23.Van Diepen, Vann H. First Flight of North Korea's "Chollima-1" SLV Fails, but More Launches and More New SLVs Are Likely. 38 North. 7 June 2023.
- 24.Smith, Josh. New North Korean space rocket features engine from ICBMs, analysts say. Reuters. June 1, 2023.
- 25.Smith, Hyonhee. North Korea unveils 'monster' new intercontinental ballistic missile at parade. Reuters. 2020-10-11.
- 26.Quang Ngai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên trình làng tên lửa đạn đạo mới. Quảng Ngãi TV. 11 October 2020.
- 27.Viewbook of DPRK 10 October 2020 Parade. Open Nuclear Network. 24. 13 October 2020.
- 28.Nguyễn Tiến. Uy lực hai 'siêu tên lửa' Triều Tiên khoe trong duyệt binh. VnExpress. 13 October 2020.
- 29.Xu, Tianran. Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Open Nuclear Network. 20 October 2021.
- 30.Hadley, Greg. North Korea Has Tested New ICBM System, Pentagon Reveals. Air and Space Forces Magazine. 11 March 2022.
- 31.Jeffrey Lewis's post. X (formerly Twitter). 2022-03-11.
- 32.Van Diepen, Vann H. Revisiting the Hwasong-17/15 Controversy: What if North Korea Had Launched a Hwasong-15. 38 North. 27 April 2022.
- 33.McCurry, Justin. North Korea confirms missile testing and says Kim Jong-un oversaw launch. The Guardian. 2022-03-25.
- 34.Brügge, Norbert. Analysis of HS-17 ICBM launches. b14643.eu. Norbert Brügge.
- 35.Zwirko, Colin. Imagery casts doubt over North Korea's Hwasong-17 ICBM claims. NK Pro. NK News. 2022-03-25.
- 36.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên phô diễn nhiều vũ khí chiến lược trong lễ duyệt binh. Gia Lai TV. 2022-04-27.
- 37.Nghe An Newspaper and Radio, Television. Cận cảnh Triều Tiên duyệt binh hoành tráng với tên lửa Hwasong-17. Truyền hình Nghệ An. 2022-04-26.
- 38.The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 2024-11-12.
- 39.Lang Son Newspaper and Radio, Television. Nhà lãnh đạo Triều Tiên Kim Jong-un giám sát việc phóng thử ICBM. Langson Radio & Television. 2022-11-19.
- 40.Ward, Alexander. North Korea displays enough ICBMs to overwhelm U.S. defense system against them. Politico. 8 February 2023.
- 41.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes. 38 North. 15 February 2023.
- 42.Zwirko, Colin. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Issues Order for Test-launch of New Type ICBM. Korean Central News Agency. Cao Bang Newspaper and radio, television. 2022-03-25.
- 43.Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. Hàn Quốc nghi Triều Tiên không phóng thử 'tên lửa quái vật' Hwasong-17 như công bố. Bắc Ninh TV. 30 March 2022.
- 44.Workers' Party of Korea. WPK Solemnly Declares Its Immutable Will to React to Enemy's Nuke and Full-frontal Confrontation in Kind - Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New-type ICBM of DPRK's Strategic Forces. Rodong Sinmun. 2022-11-19.
- 45.Krasteva, Gergana. Title of DPRK Hero Awarded to New-type ICBM Hwasongpho-17 Launching Vehicle. Korean Central News Agency. 2022-11-27.
- 46.Hồng Anh. Triều Tiên thử ICBM có khả năng tấn công bất cứ nơi nào trên lãnh thổ Mỹ. Báo Tây Ninh. Tay Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television Station. 2022-11-19.
- 47.North Korea confirms fired ICBM, says it was Hwasong-17. Al Jazeera. 17 March 2023.
- 48.Kim, Tong-hyung. North Korea says ICBM test aimed to strike fear into enemies. AP News. 17 March 2023.
- 49.NADA and Academy of Defence Science Conduct Important Test for Developing Reconnaissance Satellite. Korean Central News Agency. 28 February 2022.
- 50.United Nations. S/2022/668. UNDOCS. 28–31, 128, 144, 148. 7 September 2022.
- 51.NADA and Academy of Defence Science Conduct Another Important Test for Developing Reconnaissance Satellite. Korean Central News Agency. 6 March 2022.
- 52.Derr, Arius. EXCLUSIVE: North Korean projectile debris fell near Pyongyang after test failure. NK News. 16 March 2022.
- 53.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Tình hình bán đảo Triều Tiên gần đây đặc biệt nóng. Gia Lai TV. 2022-05-05.
- 54.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên phóng 3 tên lửa đạn đạo. Gia Lai TV. 2022-05-25.
- 55.As North Korea unveils stamps of Kim's daughter, South doubts she is successor. South China Morning Post. 16 February 2023.
- 56.Zwirko, Colin. North Koreans should display nuclear missile trinkets on desks, state media says. NK News. 15 September 2023.
- 57.Thanh Vân. Triều Tiên lập ngày nghỉ lễ mới để đánh dấu vụ phóng thành công tên lửa ICBM Hwasong-17. Truyền hình Thanh Hóa. Thanh Hoa Radio and Television. 2023-11-05.
- 58.Ninh Binh News & Radio, Television Station. Triều Tiên tuyên bố bất ngờ về năng lực hạt nhân. NBTV. 2023-11-07.
- 59.Smith, Joe. Toy model of North Korea's biggest missile on sale for tourists in Pyongyang. NK News. 1 May 2024.
- 60.Smith, Joe. North Korean store hawks new fireworks modeled on its mightiest missile. NK News. 20 May 2024.
- 61.Zwirko, Colin. North Korea vaunts new satellite's nuclear attack role in propaganda posters. NK News. 7 December 2023.
- 62.New N.Korea propaganda posters highlight nuclear-tipped missiles. Euronews. 14 September 2022.
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