Hwasong-11A
The Hwasong-11A, also known as KN-23 under the United States naming convention and other names, is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).[32] Unveiled in February 2018 and first test-fired in May 2019, Hwasong-11A is the most notable variant of Hwasong-11 series of solid-fueled SRBMs. Analysts believe the missile, with its quasi-ballistic trajectory and a range of up to, may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defenses. It can be launched from road-mobile platforms, railway car and silo.
Also recorded as KN-23 · Hwasong-11Ga · Hwasong-11Ka · Hwasongpho-11 Ka
Hwasong-11A
- Name
- Hwasong-11A
- Field
- short-range ballistic missile
- Region
- North Korea
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Documentary summary
The Hwasong-11A, also known as KN-23 under the United States naming convention and other names, is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).[32] Unveiled in February 2018 and first test-fired in May 2019, Hwasong-11A is the most notable variant of Hwasong-11 series of solid-fueled SRBMs. Analysts believe the missile, with its quasi-ballistic trajectory and a range of up to, may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defenses. It can be launched from road-mobile platforms, railway car and silo.
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In this article
Overview
Overview
Variants of the Hwasong-11A include a larger warhead version, a smaller version and an underwater-launched version. The missile has been reported to be used by Russian forces during the Russo-Ukrainian war.[47]
Key facts
Key facts
• Name — Hwasong-11A • Type — Short-range ballistic missile • Origin — North Korea • Is Missile — yes • Service — 2019–present • Used By — North Korea (Korean People's Army Strategic Force) Russia • Wars — Russo-Ukrainian war • Design Date — 2018 • Manufacturer — February 11 Plant • Developed Into — See #Variants • Filling —, nuclear and conventional • Engine — Solid-fueled engine • Propellant — Solid composite • Guidance — Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation • Launch Platform — * 8×8 wheeled TEL • Tracked launcher • Railway car • Silo
Naming
Naming
As of 2026, North Korean state media refers to Hwasong-11A as Hwasongpho-11 Ka and classified it as a tactical ballistic missile.[23] It was first mentioned directly during a test in May 2025.[24] Formerly, when the official designation of Hwasong-11A was revealed, its Korean name was[25] "" (Mars Type 11A), sometimes romanized as Hwasong-11Ga, with the letter "Ga" being the first letter of the Korean alphabet. The official designation can also be alternatively romanized as Hwasongpho-11Ga or Hwasong-11Ka.[26][27] However, as the missile and KN-02 Toksa, whose official designation is "Hwasong-11", are totally different missiles, the Hwasong-11A (and its subsequent variants) can not be called Hwasong-11.[28] In its earlier launches, occurred between 2019 and 2023, North Korea called Hwasong-11A "tactical guided weapon", "tactical guided missile" and "tactical ballistic missile", without mentioning official designation.[29] The Hwasong-11A has been known by its external designations and nicknames, with the United States and South Korea naming it KN-23 and 19-1 SRBM respectively.[31] Analysts also call the missile Kimskander (a portmanteau of Kim Jong Un and Iskander), given its similarities to the Russian counterpart.[33][34]
History
History
In mid-October 2017, North Korea apparently tested a solid-fueled engine in Hamhung, possibly a static test of Hwasong-11A's engine. North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018, when it was mounted on Taebaeksan wheeled launchers.[35] More than a year later, on 4 May 2019, North Korea publicly tested Hwasong-11A for the first time. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles. On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023.[36] The official name of KN-23 was first suggested as Hwasong-11A in October 2021, after the confirmation of KN-24's official name.[37] During the "Weaponry Exhibition-2023" military exhibition held in July 2023, North Korea confirmed this designation. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A launchers, in road- and rail-mobile variants.[38] Another launch of Hwasong-11A occurred on 8 May 2025, during a military drill that also involved KN-25.[39] It was the first known Hwasong-11A launch since 2023.[41] Further launches of this missile occurred in April and September 2026.[42]
Mass production
Mass production
In November 2024, satellite imagery revealed that the buildings at the February 11 Plant (Hamhung), used to manufacture ballistic missiles (including Hwasong-11A), were expanded, likely related to increased production.[44] Images published by North Korean state media during Kim Jong Un inspection to missile factories in December 2025 and June 2026 suggested Hwasong-11A had been entered mass production for conventional warfare, with approximately 90 non-warhead Hwasong-11A missiles showed in December 2025 visit and around 80 missile bodies in June 2026 visit.[45][46]
Russian use in Ukraine
Russian use in Ukraine
The Hwasong-11A has been identified to be used since at least December 2023 by Russian forces and possibly, one of North Korean missile units for a time, during the Russo-Ukrainian war. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles.[48] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name. According to the Conflict Armament Research (CAR), 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[49] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[50] During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A missiles.[51][52] On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[53] In August 2024, the CAR documented the debris of four additional North Korean ballistic missiles that landed in Ukraine. These debris, retrieved in Bila Tserkva, Vitrova Balka and Rozhivka, were identified as debris from North Korean missiles, likely from Hwasong-11A.[54] In December 2024, during an interview, Ukrainian military official Andrii Cherniak claimed that Russia had used around 60 Hwasong-11A missiles in their attacks against Ukraine.[55] According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia 148 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles.[56] In February 2025, it was also reported the Hwasong-11A missiles used by Russia in Ukraine had an improved CEP of[57][58]. Ukraine also claimed that Russia launched Hwasong-11A in the 23 April 2025 Russian attack on Kyiv. Information from a Ukrainian source obtained by Reuters indicated that the Hwasong-11A missiles were armed with a warhead.[59] In May 2025, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) published images of Hwasong-11A's debris collected in Ukraine. In April 2026, a Ukrainian report revealed that North Korean ballistic missiles (including Hwasong-11A) used by Russia in 2024 were made using commercial electronics with outdated manufacturing methods (up to 50 years old) and used less energy-efficient fuel, requiring North Korean missiles to use larger engines to achieve the same range as Russian counterpart.[60] Ukraine also confirmed that Hwasong-11A is not a direct copy or licensed production of Russia's Iskander.[61] Four months later, Ukraine claimed that North Korea had supplied another batch of 40 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles to Russia and would deploy a missile unit that could be equipped with six launchers and additional 120 missiles (including Hwasong-11A).[62]
Confirmed tests
Confirmed tests
• Attempt — Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) — Location — Number of missiles tested — Outcome — Additional notes — References • 1 — 4 May 2019 — Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province — 2 — These missiles reached an apogee of and a range of. The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test.[63] • 2 — 9 May 2019 — Baegun, North Pyongan Province or Kusong — 2 — Both missiles achieved apogee. One had a range of and the other had. At least one missile may have used depressed trajectory. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[64] • 3 — 25 July 2019 — Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province — 2 — Both missiles again reaching in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of, before landing in the Sea of Japan. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[65] • 4 — 6 August 2019 — Kwail Airport, South Hwanghae Province — 2 — Two missiles were launched, overflew Pyongyang and achieved an apogee of out to. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire.[68] • 5 — 27 January 2022 — Hungnam, Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province — 2 — These missiles flew to a maximum altitude of and demonstrated depressed trajectory. North Korea stated the test was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. Taken together, this suggests that the missile is operational. • 6 — 1 October 2022 — Sunan District, Pyongyang — 2 — These missiles achieved apogee. One missile flew, the other flew. A part of military drills occurred between 25 September and 9 October 2022, Kim Jong Un oversaw the test.[69] • 7 — 6 October 2022 — Samsok District, Pyongyang — 1 — The missile achieved apogee and flew. It was launched just about 15 minutes after the launch of a KN-25 missile and may have used an irregular trajectory. A part of military drills occurred between 25 September and 9 October 2022, the launch was under Kim Jong Un supervision.[70] • 8 — 14 March 2023 — Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province — 2 — According to North Korea, these missiles hit the target away. South Korea said these missiles had flown[71][72]. • 9 — 27 March 2023 — Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province or Ryokpho District, Pyongyang — 2 — These missiles achieved apogee and flew. According to North Korea, the missiles exploded at an altitude of about above a target near Kimchaek. The launch was a simulation test of an air-borne nuclear attack.[73] • 10 — 8 May 2025 — Wonsan — At least 1 — The missile achieved apogee, flew and was launched along with several KN-25 missiles. According to North Korea, the launch was to familiarize military units with the operation of the weapon systems (including Hwasong-11A) and assess the quick reaction reliability of the command and control system in any nuclear crisis. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test along with senior officials. • 11 — 8 April 2026 — Wonsan — At least 1 — South Korean military detected launches throughout the morning and the afternoon on 8 April near Wonsan. The morning launch saw multiple ballistic missiles were fired and flew. The afternoon launch involved another missile that travelled over. Statement from North Korean state media mentioned a weapon test campaign occurred between 6–8 April, and one of the tests involved the submunition-armed Hwasong-11A that "can reduce to ashes" targets within an area of with full firepower. There was another test-fire of a missile engine using low-cost materials that may also involve Hwasong-11A. The Korean Central News Agency[77] did not publish any images of the test campaign.[74] • 12 — 12 September 2026 — South of Wonsan — At least 1 — The Hwasong-11A launch was the part of a broader attack drill involving "new combat systems", including KN-25, attack drones and Hwasal-series cruise missiles. However, in this launch, Hwasong-11A was called "tactical ballistic missile" instead of its formal name, unlike the May 2025 and April 2026 launches. South Korea detected the launch of several ballistic missiles at 5:20 a.m., flying about. According to North Korean state media, who delayed the coverage to two days after the drill, the participated subunits were selected from five artillery and missile joint units.[75][76]
Alleged tests
Alleged tests
Member states of the United Nations Security Council alleged that there were test-fires of Hwasong-11A on 5 June 2022 and 9 November 2022.[78][79] It is also possible that a test of Hwasong-11A took place in June 2023, with two missiles being launched and one of which travelled. An alleged test-fire of Hwasong-11A took place on 4 January 2026,[80] but it is highly likely that it involved Hwasong-11E, based on the description of "hypersonic missile" by North Korean state media.[81] According to German analyst Norbert Brügge, North Korea might launch Hwasong-11A during an undated test, with an image showing a TEL of Hwasong-7.
Variants
Variants
Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:
Design and development
Design and development
North Korea has expressed interest in rail-mobile ballistic missile launchers for a long time, likely started in late-1980s and early-1990s. However, due to international sanctions, this interest accelerated in early 2000s.[82] In early 2021, during the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, a railway-borne missile regiment was founded.[83][84] On 15 September 2021, North Korea test-fired two missiles from a modified railway car, rather than the typical road-mobile launcher.[85] These missiles appeared to be baseline Hwasong-11A versions, although North Korean state media did not mention it explicitly. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launch railcar uses two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL. The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles than the railway-borne. However, its enhanced mobility enables North Korea to launch missiles from anywhere in its rail network, and the train launchers can be disguised as passenger trains to avoid external surveillance, making it more difficult to be detected pre-launch. Adding railway launchers may also be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[86] On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway-launched Hwasong-11A. The next day, the Korean Central News Agency[93] released photos of the test.[87]
List of tests
List of tests
• Attempt — Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) — Location — Number of missiles tested — Outcome — Additional notes — Reference(s) • 1 — 15 September 2021 — Yangdok County, South Hamgyong Province — 2 — These missiles were launched with a five-minute interval, travelled to a maximum altitude of before landing inside Japan's exclusive economic zone. Pak Jong-chon oversaw the test. • 2 — 14 January 2022 — South of Uiju County, North Pyongan Province — 2 — These missiles were launched without any prior notices, flew and achieved apogee.[88][89] • 3 — 2 November 2022 — Unknown — Unknown — Unknown — Information based on images released by the Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. The missile appears to be railway-borne.[90]
Design and development
Design and development
On 19 March 2023, North Korea test-fired a ballistic missile during a drill claimed by North Korean state media as nuclear counterattack simulation.[91] The missile appeared to be Hwasong-11A, based on photos released by the Korean Central News Agency. The missile was fired from an underground silo, located within the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and constructed for less than two months. It is the first known missile launch from silo of North Korea.[94] Images showed the rising, V-shaped exhaust flame, consistent with the launch from an underground silo.[95] The use of silo can help North Korea fire missiles with little warning while avoiding outside surveillance.[96] However, given its vulnerability and operational unfavorables, the deployment of silo-based missiles may be limited, despite several economic advantages, including effective operation and maintenance cost, as well as low construction expense.
List of tests
List of tests
• Attempt — Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) — Location — Number of missiles tested — Outcome — Additional notes — References • 1 — 19 March 2023 — Sohae Satellite Launching Station — 1 — The missile reached apogee, flew and was equipped with a simulated tacical nuclear warhead that detonated at an altitude of. It may have utilized an irregular trajectory. Kim Jong Un and his daughter oversaw the test.[97]
Larger variant
Larger variant
Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[98] It was first tested on 25 March 2021, with North Korean state media calling it "new-type tactical guided projectile".[99] A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[100]
Smaller variant
Smaller variant
Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[102] Its first test occurred on 16 April 2022 when North Korea called it "tactical guided weapon",[103] and a test launch occurred on 19 April 2026 resulted in the publication of the official designation by KCNA.[104]
Hypersonic glide vehicle variant
Hypersonic glide vehicle variant
The Hwasong-11E is a Hwasong-11C-based variant of Hwasong-11A with hypersonic glide vehicle, first displayed in 2025 during a military exhibition.[105] It highly likely underwent a test launch on 4 January 2026.[106]
SLBM variant
SLBM variant
Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A. It was tested on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.
Description
The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[1][2] However, it is significantly larger than the Iskander, with estimated length and diameter to be and, respectively.[4] The mass estimation of Hwasong-11A is also different, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies giving a mass of, while a 2026 assessment published by 38 North estimates it to be for flight simulations. The missile is painted army green,[5] as well as likely uses the same diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[6][7] Data from test-fires shows a minimum range of using depressed trajectory, with the maximum range being assessed as[8], putting all of South Korea within range. It is believed that Hwasong-11A's maximum flight altitude is[9]. With a warhead, the missile has an estimated range of[10]. The missile's warhead section has enough space for up to of high explosives compared to for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and of 9K720 Iskander.[11] It can be conventional, likely unitary, nuclear, or submunition,[12] which can devastate large areas with high firepower.[13] The Hwasong-11A is also capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[14] Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone. The Hwasong-11A's launch platform is diverse. It can be launched from a wheeled, four-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL), or a tracked one. Both are capable of carrying two missiles.[15][16] However, the four-axle truck used in test-fires is different from the truck used to carrying the missile during 8 February 2018 military parade.[17] Hwasong-11A also has railway-based mobile launch platform,[18] as well as silo-based launcher.[20] The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being solid-fueled and capable of rapid firing from mobile launchers, Hwasong-11A is difficult for an opposing force to locate and target, meaning it is ideal for fast and precise tactical attacks. Once launched, it is very hard to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems, as the missile can fly at low altitude, conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver, and have a short overall flight time. For example, Hwasong-11A's trajectory is too low or too high for THAAD and MIM-104 Patriot to intercept reliably, respectively.[21] Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target. It is capable of following non-ballistic trajectories, including depressed ballistic trajectories, pitch down to approach target from directly above, and range-extension using aerodynamic lift. The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called "Juche projectiles", it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10. It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[22]
Primary material
Documents and archives
reference work
- “Hwasong-11A”, English Wikipedia, consulted as further reading
Reputable secondary · Wikipedia
- Wikidata, structured authority record Q65232683: Hwasong-11A
Reputable secondary · Wikidata
scholarly index
- OpenAlex bibliographic index, 9 indexed publications naming Hwasong-11A.
Unverified · OpenAlex
Notes from the source article
Cited by Wikipedia
Notes from the source article
These works are cited by the source article, in its own numbering. They are recorded as its citations, not as sources VALÉORINE has verified.
- 1.Elleman, Michael. North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 9 October 2019.
- 2.Center for Strategic and International Studies. KN-23. Missile Threat. 1 July 2019.
- 3.KN-23. Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.
- 4.Savelsberg, Ralph. Assessing the Maneuverability of North Korea's KN-23/Hwasong-11A SRBM. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 3 March 2026.
- 5.Xu, Tianran. A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles. Datayo. 2020-04-23.
- 6.Brügge, Norbert. Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3. b14643.eu. Norbert Brügge.
- 7.Conflict Armament Research. Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine. ArcGIS StoryMaps. 2024-01-19.
- 8.Bạch Dương. Tên lửa KN-23 'bản sao Iskander-M' có thể bắn xa tới 900 km. An ninh Thủ đô. 23 January 2024.
- 9.North Korea fires second ballistic missile in six days ahead of Korea-U.S. drills. Korea JoongAng Daily. 2026-08-12.
- 10.United States Naval Institute. Report to Congress on North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs. USNI News. 26 January 2023.
- 11.Delory, Stéphane. North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25. Foundation for Strategic Research. 57, 77. 2023.
- 12.Đào Cảnh. Tên lửa Hwasong-11A đầu đạn bom chùm ‘biến mọi mục tiêu thành tro bụi’ trên diện tích 7 hecta. VietNamNet. 2026-04-10.
- 13.Hwasongpho-11 Ka, el peligroso misil de Corea del Norte que convierte en cenizas a sus enemigos. El Universo. 2026-04-10.
- 14.Trà Khánh. Giải mã đầu đạn hạt nhân Triều Tiên khiến Mỹ và đồng minh lo sợ. VTC News. 11 April 2023.
- 15.Xu, Tianran. 25 April 2022 DPRK Parade. Open Nuclear Network. 19. 2 May 2022.
- 16.Hansen, Nick. Nuclear-capable missiles. Asia Pacific Leadership Network. 49. 1–4 December 2020.
- 17.DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022. Open Nuclear Network. 11. 2022-04-21.
- 18.Van Diepen, Vann H. It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 17 September 2021.
- 19.Xu, Tianran. The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher. Open Nuclear Network. 17 September 2021.
- 20.Newdick, Thomas. Silo-Launched Ballistic Missile Capability Likely Tested By North Korea. The War Zone. Recurrent Ventures. 2023-03-20.
- 21.Danh Toại. Mỹ giải mã 'Kimskander' Triều Tiên: có thể vượt qua hệ thống phòng thủ. Thanh Niên. 16 May 2019.
- 22.Lewis, Jeffrey. Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2019-06-05.
- 23.DPRK Defence Science Research Institutes Conduct Tests of Important Weapon Systems. Korean Central News Agency. 2026-04-09.
- 24.Joint Striking Drill of Long-range Artillery and Missile Systems of Sub-units of KPA on Eastern Front Conducted. Minju Joson. 9 May 2025.
- 25.JSF. Yahoo News Japan. 30 July 2023.
- 26.Barannikova, Anastasia. Nuclear strategy of the DPRK: Doctrine evolution and future prospects. Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability. 15 March 2024.
- 27.Quang Ngai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên thử nghiệm thành công tên lửa đạn đạo mang đầu đạn chùm. Quảng Ngãi TV. 2026-04-09.
- 28.JSF. Yahoo News Japan. 2024-07-03.
- 29.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea's Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 31 January 2022.
- 30.Army Unit in Charge of Important Operation Task in Central Front Conducts Missile Firing Drill. Korean Central News Agency. 28 March 2023.
- 31.Anh Minh. Nga giúp Triều Tiên cải tiến tên lửa?. Dân trí. 2025-02-19.
- 32.Noh, Ji-won. N. Korea’s “new large-caliber guided rockets” were actually SRBMs, S. Korean military says. The Hankyoreh. 20 January 2020.
- 33.Cohen, Zachary. North Korean missile launch a ‘new type of threat,’ South Korea says. CNN. 25 July 2019.
- 34.An Bình. Chuyên gia Mỹ nghi Triều Tiên sao chép tên lửa tiên tiến Iskander của Nga. Dân trí. 2019-05-16.
- 35.NK News. Hwasong-11A (Hwasong-11Ka, KN-23). NK Pro. 2026-08-17.
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- 38.International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2025. Routledge. 12 February 2025. 978-1041049678.
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- 40.Feng, John. North Korea Photos Show Nuclear Counterattack Missile Test. Newsweek. 9 May 2025.
- 41.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea Continues to Improve Nuclear Posture. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 2025-07-31.
- 42.Van Diepen, Vann H. Cluster Warhead Tests Underscore the Important Conventional Role of North Korea’s SRBMs. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 22 April 2026.
- 43.Pyongyang says latest missile launches part of coordinated firepower strike drill. Korea JoongAng Daily. 2026-09-14.
- 44.Kent, Laurent. North Korea expands weapons plant that makes missiles used by Russia, researchers say. CNN. 2024-11-26.
- 45.Yang, Ji-ho. The Chosun Ilbo. 2025-12-26.
- 46.Van Diepen, Vann H. North Korea’s Expanding Production of Uranium and Conventional Missiles. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 15 July 2026.
- 47.Van Diepen, Vann H. The KN-23 Goes to War: Has It Improved North Korea’s Missiles?. 38 North. The Henry L. Stimson Center. 2026-08-14.
- 48.Mason, Jeff. White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine. Reuters. 5 January 2024.
- 49.Sokolin, Anton. North Korea used US parts in ballistic missile Russia fired at Ukraine: Report. NK News. 21 February 2024.
- 50.Sokolin, Anton. Newly made North Korean missile used in Russian strike on Ukraine: Report. NK News. 12 September 2024.
- 51.Ukraine shows evidence Russia fired North Korea missile at Kharkiv. Reuters. 6 January 2024.
- 52.Nichols, Michelle. Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv. Reuters. 29 April 2024.
- 53.Balmforth, Tom. Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis. Reuters. 7 May 2024.
- 54.Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. MSMT/2025/1. 10, 12. 2025-05-29.
- 55.Hai Phong newspaper and radio, television. Tình báo Ukraine: Triều Tiên sẽ chuyển 150 tên lửa đạn đạo cho Nga. THP3. 2025-01-24.
- 56.Balmforth, Tom. Missile that killed 12 in Russian strike on Kyiv was North Korean, Zelenskiy says. Reuters. 24 April 2025.
- 57.North Korea’s increasingly accurate missiles raise concerns. Radio Free Asia. 10 February 2025.
- 58.Balmforth, Tom. Exclusive: Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia's North Korean missiles. Reuters. 6 February 2025.
- 59.McCurry, Justin. From ammunition to ballistic missiles: how North Korea arms Russia in the Ukraine war. The Guardian. 25 April 2025.
- 60.Loh, Matthew. North Korean ballistic missiles were made with outdated methods from up to 50 years ago: Ukraine MOD. Business Insider. 17 April 2026.
- 61.Thành Vinh. Ukraine giải mã cấu tạo tên lửa KN-23 và KN-24 của Triều Tiên. Báo Nghệ An. Nghe An Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2026-04-17.
- 62.Newdick, Thomas. North Korea Upping Ballistic Missile Supplies To Russia Would Be Bad News For Ukraine At The Worst Time. The War Zone. Recurrent Ventures. 2026-08-05.
- 63.Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front. Korean Central News Agency. 5 May 2019.
- 64.Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front. Korean Central News Agency. 10 May 2019.
- 65.Nghe An Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên nói phóng tên lửa để cảnh báo “những kẻ hiếu chiến” ở Seoul. Truyền hình Nghệ An. 2019-07-26.
- 66.Thành Đạt. Nhật Bản "giải mã" tên lửa mới phóng của Triều Tiên. Dân trí. 2019-07-29.
- 67.Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon. Korean Central News Agency. 26 July 2019.
- 68.Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles. Korean Central News Agency. 7 August 2019.
- 69.Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes. Korean Central News Agency. 10 October 2022.
- 70.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên phóng 2 tên lửa tầm ngắn ra vùng biển phía Đông, Thủ tướng Nhật Bản phản đối mạnh mẽ. Gia Lai TV. 2022-10-06.
- 71.North Korea confirms firing of two ground-to-ground ballistic missiles Tuesday. Korea JoongAng Daily. 15 March 2023.
- 72.Missile Launching Drill Conducted in DPRK. Korean Central News Agency. 15 March 2023.
- 73.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Triều Tiên xác nhận thử tên lửa, đánh dấu vụ thử thứ 7 trong tháng. Gia Lai TV. 28 March 2023.
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- 75.Joint Firepower Attack Drill of Long-range Artillery and Missile Units of Combined Units at All Levels of KPA Held. Korean Central News Agency. 2026-09-14.
- 76.Zwirko, Colin. North Korea launched several missiles and drones in ‘concentrated’ attack drill. NK News. 2026-09-14.
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- 88.Firing Drill of Railway-borne Missile Regiment Held. Korean Central News Agency. 2022-01-15.
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- 102.Gwadera, Zuzanna. North Korea doubles down on short-range ballistic-missile production. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 24 August 2024.
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- 104.DPRK Missile Administration Test-fires Tactical Ballistic Missiles. Korean Central News Agency. 2026-04-20.
- 105.Trevithick, Joseph. New North Korean Hypersonic Missile Unveiled At Pyongyang Arms Expo. The War Zone. Recurrent Ventures. 2025-10-06.
- 106.When Pyongyang is afraid, opportunity emerges. The Korea Times. 2026-01-05.
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1- short-range ballistic missileTerminology
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Hwasong-11A is recorded as a kind of short-range ballistic missile. Connected to 1 other published record in the VALÉORINE Encyclopedia.
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