Hwasong-14
Also recorded as KN-20
Hwasong-14
- Name
- Hwasong-14
- Field
- intercontinental ballistic missile
- Region
- North Korea
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wikidata · Q31910913 · wikipedia · Hwasong-14
In this article
Key facts
Key facts
• Name — Hwasong-14 • Type — Intercontinental ballistic missile • Service — First successful test on 4 July 2017 • Is Missile — yes • Origin — North Korea • Used By — Korean People's Army Strategic Force • Number — Unknown • Propellant — UDMH/ • Production Date — 2017–present • Engine — Two-stage, liquid-fueled • Engine Power — (first stage) (second stage) • Launch Platform — Road-mobile TEL • Vehicle Range — 10,000 km • Altitude — (lofted trajectory)
Key facts
Key facts
• Title — Korean name • Context — north • Hangul — 《화성-14》형 • Hanja — 火14型 • Rr — Hwaseong 14-hyeong • Mr — Hwasŏng 14-hyŏng • Headercolor — green The Hwasong-14 is a mobile intercontinental ballistic missile developed by North Korea. It had its maiden flight on 4 July 2017, which coincided with the United States' Independence Day. North Korea is the only known operator of this missile.
Engine
Engine
Michael Elleman of IISS and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists both claim that available evidence clearly indicates that the engine is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines for the R-36 missile, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14, which is capable of producing a thrust of. According to Michael Elleman, through illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine, North Korea acquired an unknown number of RD-250 engines. Its need for an alternative to the failing Hwasong-10 and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidences, suggests the transfers occurred in 2015–2017. South Korean intelligence data shows North Korea received 20 to 40 RD-251 engines from Russia in 2016. Ukraine rejected this theory, claiming it was "most likely provoked by Russian secret services" to "cover their own crimes", and to prevent United States from transferring FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile to Ukraine. Other US experts have questioned whether the evidence for Elleman's theory is strong enough to back up his claims. Engine maker Yuzhnoye Design Office denied that the engines were supplied to North Korea by Ukraine. In August 2017, the State Space Agency of Ukraine claimed that the rocket engine used during 28 July 2017 North Korea's missile test was RD-250 made at a Ukrainian factory, but solely for use in Tsyklon space rockets supplied to Russia. The space agency chief said that according to Ukrainian information, "Russia today has between 7 and 20 of the Tsyklon rockets...They have these engines, they have the documentation. They can supply these engines from the finished rockets to whoever they want." The agency also claimed that a total of 223 Tsyklon-2 and Tsyklon-3 rockets were supplied to Russia. Furthermore, he stated that North Korea cannot produce the fuel for the RD-250 (N 2 O 4 and UDMH), and that it must have been produced either in China or in Ukraine. Arms expert Jeffrey Lewis claimed that the second stage of Hwasong-14 is similar to the upper stages designed for the Iranian space launch vehicles. According to German expert Norbert Brügge, the second stage engine has a thrust of.
Early plan for ICBM and suspected engine tests
Early plan for ICBM and suspected engine tests
In 2012 and 2015, North Korea displayed two versions of Hwasong-13. However, the Hwasong-13 project was apparently cancelled. In early 2017, during his New Year's speech, Kim Jong Un announced that North Korea was in the final stages of testing its ICBM. In March and June 2017, North Korea was suspected to test Hwasong-14's engine twice.
First test flight
First test flight
The first publicly announced flight test was on 4 July 2017, to coincide with the US Independence Day celebrations. This flight had a claimed range of 933 km eastwards into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) and reached an altitude of 2802 km during a 39-minute flight. This range was deliberately shortened, to avoid encroaching on other nations' territory, by 'lofting' the missile: firing it on a trajectory that was inefficiently high, rather than optimised for range. This allows the missile's performance to be tested and demonstrated, without requiring a huge test range. A prediction for the possible range, following an optimum trajectory, has been given at 6700 km or as much as 10,400 km not taking into account the Earth’s rotation. If true, then this brings the U.S. states of Alaska and Hawaii within the missile's range.
Second test flight
Second test flight
Preparations for a second test flight were detected by US intelligence as early as 20 July. On 28 July, the missile was fired at 11:41 p.m local time, the first time a night-time launch was carried out. The missile was fired at a lofted trajectory with apogee of 3,700 km, landing 998 km away with a total flight time of approximately 47 minutes. Based on the data from the test flight, if the missile were fired at the optimal efficient trajectory, it is predicted that the maximum effective range would exceed 10,000 km. If factoring in the rotation of the Earth, which may provide a range boost when travelling eastward, the Hwasong-14’s coverage area would include the US West Coast, Chicago, and possibly even New York, but only with a substantially reduced payload.
List of Hwasong-14 tests
List of Hwasong-14 tests
• Attempt — Date — Location — Pre-launch announcement or detection — Outcome — Additional notes — References • 1 — 4 July 2017 — near Panghyon Airport, — None — ICBM variant of Hwasong-12 with a second stage added and smaller reentry vehicle was fired on a lofted trajectory with apogee of 2,802 km, landing 933 km away in the Sea of Japan. • 2 — 28 July 2017 — | near Mupyong-ni, Chagang Province — Detected by US intelligence since 20 July. — The missile was fired on a lofted trajectory with apogee of 3,724.9 km, landing 998 km away in the Sea of Japan near Hokkaido, with a total flight time of 47 minutes, 12 seconds.
Gallery
Gallery
• Illustration — Kim Jong Un's order for the first test flight • Illustration — Kim's order for the second test • Illustration — Very high angle lofted trajectories of Hwasong-14, along with Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-17
Description
The Hwasong-14 is likely a two-stage version of the Hwasong-12 first tested in May 2017. The second stage appears to have increased its range. The first stage engine appears very similar to the Hwasong-12. With a single liquid fuel engine, it has four vernier thrusters for stability and guidance. Based on images, the missile is estimated to be long and wide, and has a takeoff mass of. A detailed analysis by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists claims that the current variant of the Hwasong-14 may not even be capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear warhead to Anchorage, Alaska. But even if North Korea is now capable of fabricating a relatively light-weight, "miniaturized" atomic bomb that can survive the extreme reentry environments of long-range rocket delivery, it will, with certainty, not be able to deliver such an atomic bomb to the lower 48 states of the United States with the rocket tested on 3 July and 28 July. A first-generation North Korean nuclear missile warhead is estimated to weigh. Calculations of the range of the Hwasong-14 carrying such a payload vary from, enough to reach Anchorage and Honolulu, Hawaii, to as much as, enough to reach major U.S. west coast cities, including Seattle and Los Angeles, but with a lighter warhead at. The -range is based on the reentry vehicle carried during the July 2017 tests, although such a payload is much lighter than North Korea is believed to be capable of weaponizing. Although the missile is mounted on a transporter erector launcher, it is launched from a detachable platform on a concrete pad. This could have several operational ramifications. It may increase the time required to launch the Hwasong-12, and limit the number of launch locations to pre-sited and pre-constructed launch pads.
Primary material
Documents and archives
reference work
- “Hwasong-14”, English Wikipedia, consulted as further reading
Reputable secondary · Wikipedia
authority record
- Wikidata, structured authority record Q31910913: Hwasong-14
Unverified · Wikidata
Notes from the source article
Cited by Wikipedia
Notes from the source article
These works are cited by the source article, in its own numbering. They are recorded as its citations, not as sources VALÉORINE has verified.
- 1.Panda, Ankit. Why Is Russia Denying That North Korea Launched an ICBM?. The Diplomat. 11 July 2017.
- 2.North Korea's Kim Jong Un says ICBM an Independence Day 'gift' to 'American b**tards': KCNA. The Straits Times. 2017-07-05.
- 3.CSIS. Hwasong-14 (KN-20). Missile Threat. 27 July 2017.
- 4.Panda, Ankit. North Korea's ICBM: A New Missile and a New Era. The Diplomat. 7 July 2017.
- 5.Brügge, Norbert. North Korean HS-14 ICBM. b14643.eu. Norbert Brügge.
- 6.Postol, Theodore. North Korea's "not quite" ICBM can't hit the lower 48 states. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 11 August 2017.
- 7.Jang, Jae-soon. N. Korea likely to have operational ICBM capable of striking U.S. West Coast next year or two: U.S. expert. Yonhap News Agency. 5 July 2017.
- 8.North Korean ICBM Appears Able to Reach Major US Cities. Union of Concerned Scientists. 28 July 2017.
- 9.Elleman, Michael. North Korea's Hwasong-14 ICBM: New Data Indicates Shorter Range Than Many Thought. 38 North. 29 November 2018.
- 10.Panda, Ankit. North Korea's New High-Performance Missile Engines Likely Weren't Made in Russia or Ukraine. The Diplomat. 2017-08-16.
- 11.Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. Chuyên gia sốc về cách Triều Tiên chế tạo tên lửa hạt nhân. Gia Lai TV. 2017-08-16.
- 12.Elleman, Michael. The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success. International Institute for Strategic Studies. 14 August 2017.
- 13.Marcois, Bart. European banks are key to North Korea's advance in missile technology. The Hill. 4 October 2017.
- 14.Ukraine denies North Korean missile components came from state-owned factory. ABC News. 15 August 2017.
- 15.Borger, Julian. North Korea attack on Guam could 'quickly escalate into war' – James Mattis. The Guardian. 15 August 2017.
- 16.Denial of the article "The secret of the North Korea's ICBM success" by the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the article "North Korea's Missile Success is linked to Ukrainian Plant, investigators say" by The New York Times. Yuzhnoye.
- 17.Kiev space chief: Engines used in North Korea rockets made for Russia but China also had fuel tech. The Japan Times. 16 August 2017.
- 18.Shim, Elizabeth. Ukraine's space agency: North Korea engine identical to ours. UPI News. 2017-08-16.
- 19.Nagasawa, Tsuyoshi. Could Iran be behind North Korea's nuclear, missile advances?. Nikkei Asia. 2017-09-26.
- 20.Hwasong-13 (KN-08, KN-14). Missile Threat. 8 August 2016.
- 21.CBS News. Kim Jong Un hints at North Korea test of intercontinental ballistic missile. 2017-01-01.
- 22.Schilling, John. North Korea Finally Tests an ICBM. 38 North. 5 July 2017.
- 23.Wright, David. North Korea Appears to Launch Missile with 6,700 km Range. Union of Concerned Scientists. 3 July 2017.
- 24.United States Department of Defense. Pentagon Spokesman Comments on North Korean Missile Launch. 28 July 2017.
- 25.Crosbie, Jack. Why North Korea's Night Missile Launch Was So Unusual. Inverse. 28 July 2017.
- 26.Schilling, John. What Next for North Korea's ICBM?. 38 North. 1 August 2017.
- 27.Ji, Dagyum. North Korea announces successful ICBM test. NK News. 5 July 2017.
- 28.Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. North Korea's Hwasong-14 Missile Launch Site Identified: The Panghyon Aircraft Factory. 38 North. 6 July 2017.
- 29.Starr, Barbara. US intelligence shows North Korean preparations for a possible missile test. CNN. 19 July 2017.
- 30.Ji, Dagyum. North Korea announces second test of Hwasong-14 ICBM. NK News. 28 July 2017.
- 31.Schilling, John. What is True and Not True About North Korea's Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation. 38 North. July 10, 2017.
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Hwasong-14 is connected to 1 other published record in the VALÉORINE Encyclopedia.
The Encyclopedia exists whether or not anything is for sale. Corrections are recorded rather than overwritten, and every version of this record is kept. Published 14 August 2026.
Elsewhere in Militaria
6,095 published records in this field, each with its sources named.
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- Hwasong-12Terminology
- Hwasong-13Terminology
- Hwasong-15Terminology
- Hwasong-16BTerminology
- Hwasong-17Terminology
- Hwasong-18Terminology
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